Abstract: This study investigates how support for Social Europe is related to citizens' welfare attitudes. On the one hand, welfare attitudes can spill over from the national to the European level, given that Social Europe aims to achieve similar goals to those of national welfare states. On the other hand, support for the welfare state can be an obstacle, if citizens perceive the nation state and the European Union as competing or substituting governance levels. Using data from the 2014 Belgian National Election Study, we take a multidimensional approach to Social Europe, capturing attitudes toward social regulations, member state solidarity, European social citizenship, and a European social security system. Results demonstrate that citizens who are more positive about the welfare state are also more supportive of Social Europe. However, positive welfare attitudes do not affect all dimensions of Social Europe to the same extent. The spillover effect of support for basic welfare state principles is strongest for policy instruments of Social Europe that are less intrusive to national welfare states (EU social regulations). By contrast, welfare state critique has a stronger impact on support for more intrusive instruments (European social citizenship).
Introduction
The debate on the social dimension of the European Union is generating more political discussion and controversy than ever before. The call for expanding Social Europe mainly comes from the political left, which is preoccupied with strengthening and preserving the achievements of national welfare states, and considers the development of Social Europe as a necessity (Føllesdal et al., 2007) . Politicians and scholars have presented a number of arguments in favor of strengthening Social Europe, including the expectation that it would increase the popular legitimacy of the European project as it could compensate for the negative consequences of economic integration by providing social protection at the EU level (Fernandes and Maslauskaite, 2013) .
Nevertheless, little scholarly attention has been paid to citizens' attitudes toward the EU's social dimension and how these positions are related to their attitudes toward national welfare states. In this study, we approach Social Europe as referring to current or proposed EU governance that establishes supranational social policies and that affects social rights and policies in the member states (Martinsen and Vollaard, 2014, p. 680) . In some respects, Social Europe strengthens the national welfare state, whereas at the same time challenging its foundations (Ferrera, 2017) . For instance, social regulations can extend national legislation, whereas the coordination of social security rights prohibits that social benefits and services are restricted to member states' own citizens. These two dynamics of Social Europe may generate different expectations about how attitudes toward national welfare states relate to support for Social Europe. On the one hand, attitudes concerning the national welfare state can spill over to the European area, given that both Social Europe and the national welfare state aim to achieve similar goals. On the other hand, it can be expected that support for the welfare state hinders support for Social Europe, if the nation state and the European Union are considered as competing or substituting governance levels (Burgoon, 2009 ).
Previous research shows that in member states with high levels of income equality, citizens who support state intervention and income redistribution have more negative attitudes toward the EU (Garry and Tilley, 2015) . Furthermore, citizens who are dissatisfied with national public services (Kumlin, 2009) , evaluate their coverage as insufficient, and have less confidence in the sustainability of their national welfare state (Beaudonnet, 2015) are also less supportive of the EU. This may indicate that citizens either blame the EU for being the cause of their malfunctioning national system or consider it-at least in advanced welfare states-as a threat. Given these results, it remains unclear what citizens expect from the EU regarding social policy, and in particular how their welfare attitudes are related to support for Social Europe.
By investigating multiple welfare attitude dimensions, the current study aims to pinpoint how welfare state support is related to support for Social Europe and whether the relationship with welfare state attitudes varies across different dimensions of Social Europe. To fully understand this linkage, we distinguish between attitudes toward the basic principles of the welfare state and welfare state critique, since their relationship with support for Social Europe is based on a different underlying logic.
Explaining support for Social Europe
Welfare attitudes: Spillover or obstacle to support for Social Europe?
We propose two explanatory mechanisms for how welfare state attitudes may relate to support for Social Europe, namely spillover or obstacle. On the one hand, Social Europe can be considered as an instrument that aims to achieve similar objectives as national welfare states.
The social dimension of the EU has developed to counterbalance the negative impact of economic deregulation and to prevent a 'race to the bottom' in social standards (Fernandes and Maslauskaite, 2013) . In this respect, Vandenbroucke (2013: 221) argues that a Social Union should guide and support the substantive development of national welfare states, based on general social standards and common objectives. From the perspective that Social Europe aims to defend the welfare state at the European level, it can be expected that advocates of the national welfare state will be more positive toward Social Europe. This spillover mechanism implies that citizens' attitudes are congruent across policy levels (Muñoz et al., 2011) . A spillover of pro-welfare attitudes to the European area is consistent with cue-taking theory, which assumes that citizens use their attitudes about domestic politics as a proxy to evaluate European integration (Anderson, 1998) . Given that many citizens have limited interest in and awareness of European politics, general attitudes toward the welfare state can be activated as a heuristic and evoke attitudes toward the EU's social dimension.
On the other hand, it is argued that Social Europe challenges the foundations of national welfare states. Ferrera (2005) points out that national welfare states are based on 'closure', as compulsory social insurance draws clear boundaries between those who are entitled to social benefits and those who are not eligible to join the social security system. European integration, on the contrary, operates on the basis of 'opening', since it attempts to redraw the boundaries of welfare at the supranational level. The EU constrains the scope and content of national bounding decisions, as well as the right to impose boundaries as such (Ferrera, 2005, p. 3).
Others have expressed concerns that European integration will not be able to restructure at the supranational level the type of solidarity that exists in national welfare states (Hemerijck, 2012; Scharpf, 2010) . Integration not only affects the boundaries of social sharing systems, but also the internal design of welfare states, for instance in the areas of pensions, health care, and social assistance. The threat that Social Europe poses to the boundaries of welfare states can nourish competition for scarce resources, whereas the impact on the internal design of the welfare state can raise concerns-especially in the most advanced welfare states-about the maintenance of social protection levels. From this viewpoint, pro-welfare attitudes may obstruct support for Social Europe. First, citizens' preferences regarding strong government responsibility for welfare and for income redistribution might be restricted to national boundaries. In this respect, pro-welfare state positions might coincide with welfare chauvinism. Second, citizens who are satisfied with their welfare regime may perceive Social Europe as a threat to institutionalized solidarity at the national level, whereas those who think that national institutions perform poorly may see it as an opportunity (Beaudonnet, 2015; Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000) .
Dimensions of support for Social Europe
The notion of 'Social Europe' can refer to different basic principles and policy options, which vary in the extent to which they are intrusive to national welfare states. By intrusiveness, we understand the degree of interference in the boundaries of solidarity on which the welfare state is based. Accordingly, empirical research shows that citizens differentiate substantially in their attitudes concerning various aspects of Social Europe (Baute et al., 2017) . Whether citizens' welfare attitudes facilitate or obstruct support for Social Europe might depend on how a particular policy instrument intervenes in the national welfare state.
The first, and least intrusive, aspect of current European social policy relates to the harmonization of national social policies. This is mainly addressed through binding and nonbinding social regulations, for instance in the fields of health and safety at work, working conditions, and equality (Falkner, 2010) . The regulatory angle of Social Europe actually supports the welfare state, as it reinforces social protection, while leaving the boundaries of national welfare states untouched. More recently, the Open Method of Coordination was introduced to facilitate an upward convergence of social standards through mutual learning and peer pressure (de la Porte, 2013) . Given the large diversity of national welfare states, complete harmonization is not aimed at. Nevertheless, the EU's instruments for harmonization are a direct pressure toward more 'bounded varieties of welfare' (Falkner, 2010) .
Second, Social Europe also requires financial solidarity that goes beyond the national welfare state (Sangiovanni, 2013) . Member state solidarity is implemented through various structural funds, which aim to reduce regional disparities in income, employment, investment, and growth within the EU (Allen, 2010) . The fiscal aid to Eurozone countries, which overturned the 'no bailout clause' during the European sovereign debt crisis, is also considered as an instrument of international redistribution. In essence, member state solidarity provides financial assistance from more affluent regions to poorer ones, on top of existing forms of institutionalized solidarity within member states. Therefore, these transfers do not erode the autonomy of member states to conduct their own social policies.
Third, the development of European social citizenship (Faist, 2001 ) is a cornerstone of Social Europe that operates according to an opposing dynamic to that of national welfare states.
It implies that EU citizens acquire access to other member states' social security schemes and that already-earned social security rights are transferrable between member states. The creation of an EU social citizenship space-which matches the EU's territorial borders-strongly infringes on the boundaries of national welfare states (Ferrera, 2005 (Ferrera, , 2017 . Currently, EU citizens receive equal social rights as nationals, without a European standard, as the amount, type, and duration of benefits depend on the country of residence.
Turning to the most intrusive dimension, Social Europe can also be implemented by policy instruments that are based on interpersonal solidarity, defining rights and obligations among EU citizens (Sangiovanni, 2013) . Such policy instruments have been proposed in the form of a European unemployment insurance scheme (Dullien, 2013) , a European minimum income benefit (Peña-Casas and Bouget, 2014), and a European child benefit (Levy et al., 2013 (Roosma et al., 2013) . Our primary interest is citizens' preferences regarding the role of the government in providing welfare. A second welfare state principle relates to the redistributive goals of the welfare state . Imposing equality of opportunities and/or outcomes is one of its main objectives (Esping-Andersen, 1990) . Support for welfare state principles is thus strongly related to egalitarian views. The third aspect, the range of government responsibilities, refers to the specific areas of life in which the government should intervene (Roller, 1995) . For instance, one might think that the government should ensure the provision of health care, pensions, unemployment benefits, child care, paid care leave, and so on.
At the European level, a similar debate is ongoing regarding the role of government, the promotion of equality, and the range of government responsibilities. Cue-taking theory (Anderson, 1998) would predict a positive relationship between support for basic welfare state principles and support for Social Europe. For instance, it assumes that citizens with a more liberal orientation are strongly in favor of the EU's internal market while being more opposed to European social policy, as they prefer less government intervention and fewer regulations.
In line with this theory, empirical studies show that citizens with egalitarian views and those who prefer higher social spending are more in favor of member state solidarity (Beaudonnet, 2014; Ciornei and Recchi, 2017) . However, welfare state development has facilitated internal bonding between insiders by means of external bounding toward outsiders (Ferrera, 2005) .
Citizens mainly think about state intervention and welfare redistribution within national boundaries. Literature on welfare chauvinism confirms that endorsing the basic principles of the welfare state is not necessarily consistent with support for welfare redistribution to nonnationals (van der Waal et al., 2010) . As a result, support for welfare redistribution and government responsibility may translate into opposition to European interference in social policy, in particular regarding the Europeanization of social rights.
In contrast to welfare state principles, welfare state critique does not refer to an ideological position as such, but to citizens' assessment of the performance and consequences of their national welfare state. The performance of the welfare state generates a certain amount of institutional trust among citizens. We consider people's trust in the social security system as an overarching evaluation of their national welfare state. However, more specific components of welfare state critique can be found in literature. Perceptions of the mistargeting of welfare benefits, and especially the overuse of benefits, are a sensitive subject among the European public (Ervasti, 2012) . One might perceive that some beneficiaries are not deserving of or not entitled to receive social benefits, which in the latter case is considered as benefit abuse.
Furthermore, perhaps the most criticized side effect of the welfare state is its economic consequences . The critique is that the welfare state is a financial burden on the government budget, increases labor costs and tax levels, and makes labor markets inflexible. Together with (dis)trust in the social security system and perceptions of benefit overuse, we consider the perceived economic consequences as a major component of welfare state critique.
Some scholars argue that both national and European institutions are evaluated similarly (Anderson, 1998) , assuming that citizens' evaluations rest on institutional trust in general (Muñoz et al., 2011) . A spillover effect may also result from a direct involvement of national governments in EU decision-making (Kritzinger, 2003) . In this regard, citizens' support for Social Europe expresses support for incumbent authorities' policies at the European level. The opposite argument -in favour of the obstacle mechanism -is also plausible, namely that national and European systems are evaluated differently, since citizens make cost/benefit evaluations of transferring sovereignty to the European level (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000) . Those who are satisfied with the functioning of the national welfare state may be more reserved about Social Europe, whereas those who perceive the welfare state as inefficient may embrace European social policy-making more enthusiastically (Beaudonnet, 2015) . This implies that strong criticism of the welfare state may boost support for Social Europe, whereas little criticism is accompanied with lower support for Social Europe. Furthermore, the policy instruments of Social Europe do not intervene in national welfare states in the same way. EU social regulations and member state solidarity are the least intrusive to national welfare states, whereas European social citizenship and interpersonal solidarity challenge and undermine the sovereignty and boundaries of the welfare states to a larger extent.
Hypotheses
In line with the arguments set out in the previous section, we assume that the spillover mechanism of basic welfare state principles will be stronger for those aspects of Social Europe that are least intrusive, because citizens will perceive them as supportive to their national welfare state. More intrusive instruments such as European social citizenship and interpersonal solidarity may be perceived as more threatening to national welfare states and raise concerns about the consequences of these policies. In sum, given that the various dimensions of Social Europe differ in the extent to which they are intrusive to the welfare state, we expect the following differentiation in the spillover and obstacle mechanism as referred to in the previous hypotheses:
H3: The spillover effect is stronger for less intrusive dimensions of Social Europe (H3a), whereas the obstacle effect is stronger for more intrusive dimensions (H3b).
Furthermore, we expect the relative importance of the welfare state principles and welfare state critique to be depending on the intrusiveness of the different dimensions of Social Europe. For dimensions that intervene more strongly in national systems, citizens' assessments of whether this will bring improvement or deterioration will gain importance. The opportunity costs of transferring social competences to the European level are much higher for citizens who are satisfied with the performance of their welfare state. Therefore, for the most intrusive components of Social Europe, the level of criticism on the welfare state is likely to be more important than the level of support for the basic principles of the welfare state. When it comes to less intrusive policy instruments, citizens' may reason more according to their ideological preferences regarding redistribution and regulations, which can be expected to have a stronger effect on support for Social Europe than their level of welfare state critique. 
H4: For less intrusive dimensions of Social

Data and methodology Data
We use data from the 2014 Belgian National Election Study (Abts et al., 2015) . This post-electoral survey was carried out among a register-based probability sample of Belgians entitled to vote in the 2014 national elections. On completion of a computer-assisted personal interview (response rate 47%), respondents were asked to fill out a 20-page drop-off questionnaire, containing a specific module on Social Europe. Applying the principles of the Tailored Design Method (Dillman et al., 2014) , we were able to convince 74% of the respondents to fill out and send back the questionnaire (N=1403).
Variables
Support for Social Europe is measured by a second-order latent factor, consisting of the four constitutive dimensions distinguished above (see Appendix 1-2 for question wording).
Each of the dimensions is specified as a latent factor. First, attitudes toward harmonization are measured by support for four types of social regulations covering health and safety at work, maximum weekly working hours, minimum terms for paid leave, and minimum terms for maternity leave. Second, attitudes concerning member state solidarity are measured by three items referring to solidarity between the richer and poorer member states. These concern support in times of economic difficulties, the amount of tax money being redistributed, and the continuation of member state solidarity in the future. Third, opinions about European social citizenship are operationalized by four items concerning citizens' attitudes toward the access of EU citizens to social benefits and protection in Belgium. One item concerns equal social rights, two items relate to prioritizing nationals, and one item refers to the conditionality of social protection. Lastly, interpersonal solidarity is measured by support for the implementation of a European social security system. One item concerns the implementation of an entire European social security system, whereas three items refer to European protection schemes for specific policy areas: Child allowances, minimum income benefits, and unemployment benefits.
Support for welfare state principles is measured by three latent factors. First, the role of the state versus the market is measured by the following agree-disagree statements recorded on a five-point scale: 'Society would be better off if the government intervened less in the market' and 'Businesses should have more freedom; therefore, regulations for businesses should be reduced.' A higher factor score indicates that respondents support greater government intervention in the economy. Second, attitudes toward the principle of equality are measured by three items (answers on five-point scales): 'The differences between classes ought to be smaller than they are at present,' 'The differences between high and low incomes should stay as they are,' and 'The government should reduce income differentials'. Higher scores indicate more egalitarian views. To measure attitudes concerning the range of government responsibilities, respondents were asked to what extent they think the government should be responsible for 'a reasonable pension,' 'affordable health care' and 'a reasonable standard of living for the employed.' Responses range from 'no responsibility' (0) to 'full responsibility' (10).
Welfare state critique is also measured by three items. First, trust in the social security system is measured on a five-point scale ranging from 'very little confidence' (1) to 'a great deal of confidence' (5). Responses were recoded so that high scores indicate high levels of distrust. Second, perceptions of benefit overuse are measured by how often respondents think it occurs that people: 'Use their health insurance although they are not sick,' 'Receive unemployment benefits although they could have a job if they wanted,' and 'Receive a minimum income although they are not actually poor.' Responses range from 'very often' (1) to 'never' (5). A latent variable was constructed with a higher score indicating greater perceptions of abuse. Lastly, attitudes to the economic outcomes of the welfare state are measured by a latent variable with three items: 'The welfare state costs too much money compared with what it yields,' 'The tasks of the welfare state are better left to the free market,'
and 'The welfare state costs companies too much and harms our economy.' Responses range from 'completely disagree' (1) to 'completely agree' (5).
We take into account basic social-structural variables such as age and gender (0=male, 1=female). Education level distinguishes between lower-secondary, higher-secondary, and tertiary education. Employment status consists of seven categories: White-collar worker, bluecollar worker, self-employed, pensioner, student, unemployed or disabled, and inactive. These are the sum of the direct effects shown in Table 1 and the indirect effects that run through the mediating variables. Information about the two types of effects (direct and total) is required to gain detailed insight into the explanatory model. Whereas the direct effects are useful to reveal differential impacts of predictors, the total effects provide insight into the general patterns in our data.
Results
Spillover or obstacle? Common patterns
First, we look at the common effects of the social-structural variables on citizens'
overall support for Social Europe. [ Table 1 ]
Specific dimensions of support for Social Europe
The second purpose of this analysis is to figure out whether the relationship between welfare attitudes and support for Social Europe varies across different dimensions of Social
Europe. Most of the welfare attitudes indeed have component-specific effects that deviate from the general pattern. This is indicated in Table 1 by the significant direct effects of the predictors on the specific attitudinal dimensions of Social Europe. From left to right, the four specific dimensions are ranked from less intrusive to more intrusive to the welfare state.
With regard to support for EU social regulations, the least intrusive dimension of Social Europe, Table 1 reveals several differential effects. First, we look at social-structural variables.
The difference between blue-collar workers and the self-employed is larger with regard to support for EU social regulations than support for other facets of Social Europe. This can be explained by the fact that the self-employed are unlikely to benefit from these regulations, which are targeted at employees. Moreover, employers have to bear part of the costs of these regulations. The difference between the reference category of blue-collar workers and the unemployed or disabled is much larger for EU social regulations, with the latter group being more in favor of these measures. This is not illogical, since the unemployed and disabled are Stronger identification with Europe increases support for this policy instrument of interpersonal solidarity even more than it influences citizens' overall level of support for Social
Europe. This finding indicates that identity is an essential element of public support for transferring more social competences to the European level. Contrary to our expectations, we find no direct effects of welfare attitudes on support for a European social security system, which is the most intrusive to national welfare states.
Our results indicate that the spillover effect of welfare attitudes from the national to the European level is not uniform for all facets of Social Europe. In addition to a set of common predictors, we find specific effects of welfare attitudes that deviate from the general pattern, confirming both hypotheses H3 and H4. More specifically, the spillover effect of welfare state principles is strongest for the dimension that is least intrusive to the national welfare state, namely EU social regulations. For example, the impact of egalitarian views is much stronger on support for EU social regulations than on support for more intrusive dimensions of Social Europe. For European social citizenship, the spillover effect seems to have weakened in favour of the obstacle effect. By contrast, the spillover effects of different types of welfare state critique are strongest for European social citizenship. These findings indicate that distrust and concerns regarding the effectiveness and consequences of welfare policies easily spill over to the European policy level, whereas support for basic principles such as government intervention and redistribution tend to be more nationally demarcated. The spillover effect depends not only on the dimension of Social Europe, but also on the type of welfare attitudes.
Discussion
Although the role of the EU and the scope of its competences in social policy are contested, Instead, they will find a social basis for it among those who prefer strong welfare states and who praise their national social security system to a larger extent. Citizens who support social protection and welfare redistribution in general also see a role for the EU in these areas.
Opposition to the growth of Social Europe will mainly be articulated by citizens who hold more negative views about the welfare state. Social Europe thus evokes a very diverse set of attitudes that cannot be reduced to welfare issues alone.
It should be noted that the scope of welfare attitudes included in this study is not exhaustive. For instance, we did not include accurate measurements of satisfaction with the coverage or quality of national welfare provisions. If citizens think that their national welfare system does not provide enough protection, they might be more supportive of EU social policy.
Furthermore, the positive relationship between support for the principles of the welfare state and support for Social Europe might even be stronger in less-advanced national welfare states.
In these countries, citizens are protected to a lesser extent by their welfare policies, which can trigger high expectations about Social Europe among left-wing voters. Future research is needed to examine whether the strength of the spillover effect varies across EU member states.
Notes
1. Including an error correlation between two items of the social regulations scale improved the model fit and is theoretically justified because both refer to regulations concerning leave.
2. Factor loading was constrained to 1, because it exceeded 1 when freely estimated.
Member state solidarity thus coincides completely with citizens' general attitude toward Social Europe. One possible measure is the introduction of a European child benefit. Through this measure the EU guarantees a minimum benefit for children in the European Union that is adapted to the cost of living in each country. To fund the European child benefit, each country would pay according to its wealth. Additionally, member states could opt to further increase the child benefit in their own country at their own expense. Are you for or against the introduction of such a European minimum child benefit by the EU? D40 European minimum income benefit A second possible measure is the introduction of a European minimum income. Through this measure the EU guarantees a minimum income benefit for all poor people in the European Union that is adapted to the cost of living in each country. To fund the European minimum income, each country would pay according to its wealth. Additionally, member states could opt to further increase the minimum income in their own country at their own expense. Are you for or against the introduction of such a European minimum income by the EU? D41 European unemployment benefit A third possible measure is the introduction of a European unemployment benefit. Through this measure the EU guarantees a minimum unemployment benefit for all temporary unemployed in the European Union that is adapted to the cost of living in each country. To fund the European unemployment benefit, each country would pay according to its wealth. Member states could opt to further increase the benefit in their country at their own expense. Are you for or against the introduction of such a European unemployment benefit by the EU? APPENDIX 3. Descriptive statistics social-structural background variables 
